A common fallacy in this business is that an avalanche of volume, food or otherwise, will drive logistics costs down materially. Bottom line is that you need to pay someone enough money to drive to the restaurant, pick up food and drive it to a diner. That takes time and drivers need to be appropriately paid for their time or they will find another opportunity. At some point, delivery drones and robots may reduce the cost of fulfillment, but it will be a long time before the capital costs and ongoing operating expenses are less than the cost of paying someone for 30-45 minutes of their time. Delivery/logistics is valuable to us because it increases potential restaurant inventory and order volume, not because it improves per order economics.
Earlier, we talked about the great progress we are making with enterprise brands. We love working with large enterprise brands because they help drive new diners to our platform and keep diners from going to other platforms. That said, the biggest enterprise brands don’t need Grubhub to bring them new diners in the same way independents and small chains do because they spend billions a year on developing their own brands. What they need most is a driver to take the food to their diners. And, as we just noted, that isn’t cheap, or particularly scalable, so the unit economics and long term profit outlook for our business would look very different if a majority of our business was coming from large enterprise brands.
The key to operating a successful Domino’s master franchise is to have the Domino’s brand stand out against all the other pizza options that are available in the marketplace. In other words, the brand has to be put to work to generate demand, which can only be achieved with significant marketing spend. Tv is still quite important for Domino’s and generally requires a significant advertising budget. That budget has to be levered on a good number of restaurants in order to make sure the marketing expenses stay at a reasonable level per store.
Every new market that’s entered starts more or less from scratch, with limited consumer awareness and entrenched behavior that benefits the incumbents. This is why it is so difficult for a new Domino’s market to get to a scale that makes economic sense. Once you manage to reach that scale that the flywheel can start spinning, because at that point the business can self-generate its growth through reinvestment in marketing.
It appears that the entire Domino’s franchise has come under a bit of pressure from aggregators like Takeaway, Uber Eats, Grubhub and Doordash, which are oftentimes operating at a loss. Since the aggregators are providing access to technology platforms that many small operators would not be able to afford or operate on their own, they’ve essentially levelled the playing field for pizza restaurants again. In my opinion this has decreased Domino’s Pizza’s advantage in the mobile ordering space. Domino’s Pizza Inc.’s CEO conceded recently that the aggregators are indeed having an effect on their same store sales growth (item below). For now I have no strong conviction on Domino’s but it is a business with some fascinating developments.
“ we did not expect such a swift reaction in the sense that we thought that we come out with IBKR Lite as an additional offering and that we go on for a while, and will attract some customers and then eventually, other people will start reducing and maybe all go to zero. So this — this very swift reaction was a surprise to us.” – Thomas Peterffy, Founder and Chairman, Interactive Brokers Group (IBKR), 3Q 2019 Earnings Call
We believe Schwab’s business stands to benefit the most because of the relatively small impact to its revenue and income and the broad, efficient set of high quality service it offers to clients. While the commission cuts mean Schwab offers an even more compelling value to its customers for its existing suite of high quality services, a disadvantaged competitor like TD Ameritrade is trying to figure out how to charge for its “premium” services for customers, effectively raising prices for service in other ways and depressing its value proposition.
Decades of experience indicates the companies offering higher value propositions win more customers. By continuing to pursue aggressive reinvestment in both client service and technological efficiency, Schwab can continue to leverage its growing scale to further improve upon the value proposition it provides clients while continuing to drive down its expense (efficiency) ratio. We believe the gap in differentiation will only get wider now that the smaller competitors are much weakened financially, which is why it made sense for Schwab to be so aggressive in cutting commissions both in 2017 and again October 2019.
Elastic isn’t building a cloud side and a on-prem side to their platform like MDB is. It’s all Elastic Stack in the Elastic Cloud, just hosted at whatever cloud provider the customer desires, and managed by the finest experts one could find — thems that wrote it! There isn’t tooling appearing in Elastic Cloud that isn’t in core platform, unlike MDB with their Stitch serverless platform. However, the downside is that their Elastic Stack releases must bundle the proprietary modules side-by-side with the open-source products.
One striking difference as I walked through the product line, is the number of use cases it solves that DO NOT INVOLVE CODE. MDB is for developers only, to embed into their application stack. Elastic is for that, but also for non-developers to use without needing any custom development. IT can hook up Beats for monitoring infrastructure or network traffic. Enterprise users can feed in datasets with Logstash, for staff to query, visualize, or apply ML in Kibana. I expect this trend to continue, as it really opens up the applicability as to who can use the product line.
Best of all, Elastic is making exciting moves that are moving their company beyond being a do-it-yourself tool provider.
Our analysis of potential merger synergies points to over €1 billion in additional profit through efficiencies and revenue growth, almost double the Company’s current targets. In the near‐term, this will be driven by cross‐selling to wholesale customers, insourcing lens procurement, and supply chain efficiencies. The longer‐term opportunity to disrupt the industry value chain is even more appealing: combining lens and frame to shrink raw material need and waste, reducing shipping costs by merging prescription labs with global distribution hubs, and providing a true omni‐channel sales offering. These initiatives will transform the way glasses are sold, significantly improving the customer experience.
While you might hear about how merchants pay 2% or more in credit card fees, Visa and Mastercard are only collecting about 1/20th of that fee, with the banks, the ones taking the credit risk, earning the bulk of the fee.
Tiffany is one of just a few global American luxury brands and the casual observer cannot tell a Tiffany diamond engagement ring from one purchased elsewhere. There’s no room on a diamond for logo placement, after all.
As a company, Tiffany is older than Cartier (founded in 1847), Louis Vuitton (founded in 1854), and Burberry (founded in 1856). This durability matters in luxury because it communicates a brand’s ability to endure all kinds of major socioeconomic changes and remain relevant over successive generations. It also communicates a certain timelessness of core products that remain in fashion despite intermittent fads and trends.
“It’s harder to reach audiences, the cost of marketing is going up, the number of channels has exponentially proliferated and the cost to cover all of those channels has proliferated,” Jay Pattisall, the lead author of the report, said in an interview. “It’s a continual pressure for marketers — we’re no longer just creating advertising campaigns three or four times a year and running them across a few networks and print.”
That includes automation and machine learning technologies, which Forrester expects will transform 80 percent of agency jobs by 2030. In July, JPMorgan Chase announced a deal with the ad tech company Persado that would use artificial intelligence to write marketing copy.
Steven Moy, the chief executive of the Barbarian agency, said that multiyear contracts had shortened, with budgets tightening and performance metrics becoming more stringent.
For the first time ever next year, Facebook, Google, YouTube and other online platforms are expected to soak up the majority of advertising dollars, according to WARC.
Last year, 78 percent of members of the Association of National Advertisers had an in-house agency, up from 58 percent in 2013 and 42 percent in 2008.