Airbnb offers investors a unique stay
Airbnb was conceptualized in August 2007 as an alternative to hotel lodging. We calculate it is now the largest player in the $150 billion alternative accommodation booking market with a high teens share, up from about 4% in 2014. We estimate that roughly half of the market’s bookings occur online, with Airbnb holding around 35% online share today versus about 10% in 2014.
We believe a premium is warranted based on several attractive features Airbnb offers investors, including (1) a powerful and rare network advantage that should drive continued share gains in a rapidly growing alternative accommodation market; (2) an opportunity to expand its network and addressable market into hotel, experiences, corporate, and transportation; and (3) strong profitability prospects driven by high consumer awareness, allowing the company to leverage top-line growth. We believe Airbnb’s IPO should be on the radar screens for investors seeking exposure to a company positioned to gain share in the nearly $700 billion global online travel market, which we estimate will grow 9.4% annually on average over the next five years.
We estimate that Booking Holdings is already second behind Airbnb in the private accommodation market, having expanded its online share to roughly 20% last year from the midteens in 2015 driven by industry-leading supply and demand ((over 5 million alternative accommodation listings and around 450 million monthly visitors). We expect Booking to continue to see share gains at the expense of smaller competitors as it invests further in its non-hotel network with the goal to become the leader in the market. We estimate that its alternative accommodation booking growth rate can begin to eclipse Airbnb’s in 2020, as Booking’s investments and powerful network advantage take hold.
We think Airbnb can gain traction in the corporate booking market, which we estimate at around $1.1 trillion, as its partnerships and initiatives reduce the back-office and safety concerns of many global firms, aiding its network advantage and growth opportunity. The company has announced several major partnerships in the past few years.
The global air and ground transportation markets are large at around $600 billion and $100 billion, respectively, but the consolidation and efficiency of the industry offers only low-single-digit take rates (compared with teens and 20% for lodging and experiences, respectively). We wouldn’t expect transportation attached rates on Airbnb lodging bookings to be more than a single-digit level, since the company can’t offer any differentiated experience. Also, travelers love to shop around for the best deal, especially in a commoditized environment like transportation. We expect just 1%-2% of Airbnb’s total revenue to come from the segment in 2022, following an anticipated launch into these markets in 2019.
EBay paid $573M to buy Japanese e-commerce platform Qoo10, filing reveals
The acquisition of Qoo10 underscores how eBay is at the same time pulling back from general plays while doubling down on more targeted opportunities. Earlier this year, the company gave up its stake in Flipkart as part of its acquisition by Walmart, but at the same time committed to investing in a new, standalone eBay operation in India, using some of the $1.1 billion in proceeds it made from selling its Flipkart stake to Walmart.
But eBay isn’t going to go head-to-head with those two. Instead, its India operations will focus on cross-border sales, so essentially looking to connect buyers and sellers in the country with opportunities overseas within its network. That’s the same model it has used to effect in other parts of the world, so its acquisition of Qoo10 and its other international services will be a key part of that India strategy, and vice versa.
How e-commerce is transforming rural China | The New Yorker
Establishing this reputation has required JD to adopt a strategy radically different from that of its greatest rival, Alibaba, which is essentially the eBay of China—a platform connecting customers to a vast network of third-party sellers. Although there are an increasing number of third-party sellers on JD’s site, the core of its business, like Amazon’s, involves managing the entire supply chain. It buys from manufacturers, stocks inventory in warehouses, and invests billions of dollars in development, including a kind of in-house FedEx, called JD Logistics. There are now nearly eighty-five thousand delivery personnel like Xia, and several thousand depots, from large hubs to tiny outlets like the one in Xinhuang. “The couriers are the faces of JD,” Liu said. “They come to your home. You have to trust them.” The success of this network, combined with the notorious unreliability of the Chinese postal service, means that JD Logistics is now itself a product—a service that other e-commerce players pay to use.
Chen explained that JD’s burgeoning focus on luxury was a consequence not only of the rise of a moneyed middle class but also of the middle class’s relative youth. Buyers of big-ticket items are five to ten years younger than their Western counterparts. “Most of them experience, and learn about, luxury brands over the phone,” she said. “So digital becomes increasingly important.”
Is JD.com the future of Chinese e-commerce?
When breaking down the costs to fulfill an order from the warehouse to the customer’s front door, about 30-35% of costs go to warehousing, another 20-25% to transporting products from the warehouse to local delivery hubs, and 40-45% to last-mile delivery, which is mostly human labor costs and transportation costs. However, this cost structure is mostly indicative of urban, densely populated regions that have large fulfillment centers and dedicated last-mile delivery staffs. Most rural cities are quite different in that they don’t have sophisticated layers of network infrastructure. For example, large fulfillment centers are replaced by small delivery depots or mom-and-pop shops acting as pick-up centers. Since most consumers pick up their packages at these centralized locations, large last-mile delivery staffs are not required. It’s hard to say if drones would result in cutting logistics costs 70% on its own, but overall the fulfillment process could achieve significant savings.
JD has always approached its business from a customer’s perspective, utilizing an integrated retail and logistics model to provide a superior experience. In JD’s early days, 70% of customer complaints involved delivery service, since China’s logistics infrastructure was essentially nonexistent. To solve this issue, JD founder Richard Liu decided to take operations in-house, recognizing this would be a critical differentiator in providing the best customer experience. JD now delivers 90%+ of direct retail orders within 24 hours, an unfathomable achievement in markets outside of China. But as other businesses eventually catch up, the question turns to where future differentiation will lie.
By integrating deeper into the supply side, JD can continue to structurally lower its cost of goods and average selling prices. While Alibaba can spur competition between merchants, lowering their gross margins in the meantime, the fragmented nature of the supply side means there isn’t structural pressure to the cost of goods side of Alibaba’s model, meaning prices can only fall so much. As JD’s lowers prices, receives inventory on more of a “just-in-time” basis, it will turn inventory quicker meaning it can lower prices even more.