Curated Insights 2019.02.22

“Hollywood is now irrelevant,” says IAC Chairman Barry Diller

“Netflix has won this game. I mean, short of some existential event, it is Netflix’s. No one can get, I believe, to their level of subscribers, which gives them real dominance.”

And that includes its closest rival Amazon Prime, which isn’t designed to bid as aggressively on tomorrow’s media stars as Netflix is. “Amazon’s model is saying, ‘If you join Prime, we’re giving you things,’” Diller said. “‘So our job is to get you to join Prime. If we can get you to do that by giving you Black Panther, or whatever, or The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel, then great.’ But that model, to people in the entertainment business, is like, ‘Oh my god, how did that happen?’”


Tollymore Investment Partners’ investment thesis on Trupanion

TRUP is vertically integrated; it owns its insurance subsidiary and is responsible for acquiring and servicing existing customers as well as underwriting their insurance. TRUP estimates this vertical integration has eliminated frictional costs of c. 20% of revenues. These economic savings have been donated to consumers in the form of higher claims payout ratios. TRUP’s strategy has therefore been to sacrifice the near-term margin upside of this cost advantage in the pursuit of a larger and stickier customer base and subscription revenue pool. This cost advantage does not manifest itself in lower prices, but rather the highest sustainable expenditure on vet invoices per dollar of premiums.

TRUP has built a database over 15 years using 7.5mn pet months of information and > 1mn claims; it has segmented the market into 1.2mn price categories in order to more accurately underwrite insurance costs for a given pet. Of course, determining the point at which the marginal returns on incremental data diminish is difficult, but according to the CEO it would take a competitor 13 years to replicate this data asset. Although Nationwide is larger by number of pets enrolled, its data are likely to be less comprehensive for two reasons: (1) a lack of data for conditions not covered by policies, such as hereditary and congenital diseases, and (2) pricing categories by state rather than zip code, even though the cost of vet care can vary widely within states. TRUP considers its ability to accurately estimate the costs of pet healthcare costs by granular sub- categories crucial to its leading value proposition. This allows for the provision of more relevant products for the customer.

The addressable market is large and underpenetrated relative to other developed markets. The differences in these other markets are not demographic, social or economic, but rather (1) the length of time comprehensive pet insurance has been available, (2) the value proposition in the form of higher claims payments as a ratio to premiums (higher loss ratios) and (3) vet vs. direct to consumer distribution models. Pet insurance companies in the US typically do not cover hereditary and congenital conditions, which are the forms of illness most likely to be suffered by cats and dogs, they increase rates when claims are made, they impose payout limits, and pay claims according to an estimated cost schedule rather than actual vet invoices. TRUP is different in all these respects and as such expects to grow the addressable market in North America to greater than 1% penetration. In any case, it appears to be the case that TRUP’s value proposition is driving adoption in North America.

The unit economics associated with the pursuit of this opportunity to grow the company’s assets are attractive. The cost to acquire a pet is c. $150, around 3x the average monthly ARPU. Assuming the current 10% discretionary margin and a six-year average pet life, the IRR on new pets is 30-40%. At a 15% discretionary margin the IRR would be double this. I estimate that both ARPUs and discretionary margins would need to decline by 20-25% to render reinvestment in pet acquisition a capital destructive pursuit. This would contradict the economic reality of a market in which pet healthcare costs are increasing mid-single digits as new technologies and treatments are ported over from human healthcare, and the scalability of the business model.

Purchases with plastic get costlier for merchants—and consumers

Merchants paid an estimated $64 billion in Visa and Mastercard credit and debit interchange fees last year, according to new data from an industry publication, the Nilson Report. That is up 12% from a year earlier and up 77% from 2012.

Other fees are on the rise, as well. Visa, the largest U.S. card network, is increasing several fees in April, according to people familiar with the matter. Unlike interchange fees that are paid to card issuers, these fees are collected by Visa.

Visa raised its “credit-card assessment fee” this year by 0.01% for most credit-card purchases made in the U.S. While seemingly small on a percentage or flat-fee basis, the increased fees that Visa will put in place during the first four months of the year are expected to cost U.S. merchants at least an additional $570 million through April 2020, according to estimates by merchants-payments consulting firm CMSPI.

But network fees aren’t the only additional charges merchants face. There are also other fees charged by firms that process merchants’ card transactions. Those, which include the network fees, totaled $14.8 billion on Visa and Mastercard debit and credit transactions in 2018, up 10% from a year earlier and 70% from 2012, according to the Nilson Report.


MSG says the Knicks aren’t for sale. It’s a good time to invest in sports either way.

That $5 billion is a big number, 25% higher than the recent $4 billion valuation by Forbes. And $5 billion amounts to more than $200 per share, or about 71% of MSG’s current stock price. Just because the number is large doesn’t mean it isn’t realistic. Don’t forget the Clippers were sold to former Microsoft (MSFT) CEO Steve Ballmer for $2 billion in 2014. That year, before the sale was announced, Forbes valued the Knicks at $1.4 billion and the Clippers didn’t crack Forbes top-10 most valuable NBA franchises.

Live TV content is part of the reason the value of sports franchises have swelled. Live content is becoming increasingly more valuable to media outlets like traditional networks and streaming companies. But other factors are also at play. Sports betting is another important avenue for franchise owners to generate brand-new streams of cash. “I think everyone who owns a top four professional sports team just basically saw the value of their team double” Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban said in 2018, after the U.S. Supreme Court cleared the way for legalized sports betting in states other than Nevada.

If the Knicks are sold, MSG would be left with the New York Rangers, the WNBA’s New York Liberty, the Hartford Wolf Pack of the American Hockey League, and the Westchester Knicks of the NBA’s developmental league. In addition to Madison Square Garden itself, MSG also owns the Hulu Theater at Madison Square Garden, Radio City Music Hall, the Beacon Theatre, the Forum, the Chicago Theatre, and the Wang Theatre.

Curated Insights 2019.02.15

Even God couldn’t beat dollar-cost averaging

My point in all of this is that Buy the Dip, even with perfect information, typically underperforms DCA. So if you attempt to build up cash and buy at the next bottom, you will likely be worse off than if you had bought every month. Why? Because while you wait for the next dip, the market is likely to keep rising and leave you behind.

What makes the Buy the Dip strategy even more problematic is that we have always assumed that you would know when you were at every bottom (you won’t). I ran a variation of Buy the Dip where the strategy misses the bottom by 2 months, and guess what? Missing the bottom by just 2 months leads to underperforming DCA 97% of the time! So, even if you are somewhat decent at calling bottoms, you would still lose in the long run.

I wrote this post because sometimes I hear about friends who save up cash to “buy the dip” when they would be far better off if they just kept buying. My friends do not realize that their beloved dip may never come. And while they wait, they can miss out on months (or more) of continued compound growth. Because if God can’t beat dollar cost averaging, what chance do you have?

Miss the worst days, miss the best days

If you missed just the 25 strongest days in the stock market since 1990, you might as well have been in five year treasury notes. This remarkable data point is almost always followed by “time in the market beats timing the market.”

If by some miracle you managed to miss the 25 best days, you likely would have missed at least some of the worst days as well. You’ll notice a few things. The best days often follow the worst days, and the worst days occur in periods of above average volatility (red dotted line). These volatility spikes happen in lousy markets, so, if you can avoid the very best days, you will probably also avoid the very worst days, thereby avoiding lousy markets.

The chart below shows what happens if you were able to successfully avoid the 25 best and 25 worst days. This would have put you well ahead of the index. Of course this assumes perfect end of day execution, no transaction costs, and most importantly, no taxes.

Why time horizon works

When earnings compound but changes in valuation multiples don’t, the importance of the latter to your lifetime returns diminishes over time. Which is great, because changes in valuation multiples are the most unpredictable part of investing. Assuming earnings compound over time – an assumption, but a reasonable one – here’s what happens when valuation multiples go up or down by, say, 20% in a given year.

Valuation changes have a majority impact on your overall returns early on because company earnings are likely the same or marginally higher than when you made the investment. But as earnings compound over time, changes in any given year’s valuation multiples have less impact on the returns earned since you began investing. So as time goes on you have less reliance on unpredictable things (voting) and more on things you’re confident in (weighing).

Spotify’s podcast aggregation play

Anchor provides a way to capture new podcasters, leading them either to Spotify advertising or, in the case of rising stars, to Spotify exclusives. Critically, because Spotify has access to all of the data, they can likely bring those suppliers on board at a far lower rate than they have to pay for established creators like Gimlet Media.

Spotify Advertising, as I just suggested, makes a strong play to be the dominant provider for the entire podcasting industry. Spotify Advertising is already operating at a far larger scale than Midroll, the incumbent player, and Spotify has access to the data of the second largest podcast player in the market.

Gimlet Media becomes an umbrella brand for a growing stable of Spotify exclusive podcasts. Critically, as I noted above, the majority of these podcasts come to Spotify not because Spotify pays them millions of dollars but simply because Spotify is better at monetizing than anyone else.

Spotify doubles down on podcasts by acquiring Gimlet and Anchor

Spotify has acquired Gimlet Media and Anchor as it doubles down on its audio-first strategy. Gimlet is the podcast production house behind popular shows such as Reply All and The Cut. With Gimlet, Spotify has acquired a team with a proven record in original content production which should enhance its competitive position relative to Apple. Anchor provides easy-to-use software for podcast creation, ad insertion, and distribution, with more than 40% share of new podcasts produced. Anchor’s wealth of data should help Spotify identify and target original content, attracting more users to its ecosystem.

Podcasts should enable Spotify to differentiate its service and reduce its dependence on the music labels. Ever since Spotify’s initial public offering, the bear case has been that it never will deliver attractive returns because the labels will demand an ever-increasing share of its revenues. If its foray into original podcasts is successful, Spotify will convert some of its variable costs into fixed costs, improving its profit margins.

The ad-supported podcast business also is attractive. As shown above, podcast listener hours are roughly 12% those of radio but only 3% of the ad dollars. That gap should close with time. More important, as is the case with TV, traditional radio is in secular decline. A generation from now, podcasts could be the default format for spoken audio. If able to secure a leadership position, Spotify could enjoy a recurring revenue model with much higher margins in the years to come.

How DJI went from university dorm project to world’s biggest drone company

“In the very beginning, we had different competitors but they were small,” said Wang in a 2015 interview with Chinese-language news site of Guangzhou-based NetEase. “We made a lot of the right decisions to stand out in the industry … I think it is DJI’s success that made the drone industry attractive to investors and users.”

Chris Anderson, the chief executive of DJI’s major rival 3D Robotics, was quoted by US media as saying that the Chinese company has been “executing flawlessly” and “we just got beaten fair and square”.

“I do not see any strong competitor for DJI so far,” said Cao Zhongxiong, executive director of new technology studies at Shenzhen-based think tank China Development Institute. “The company can dominate the drone industry for some years to come.”

“We found success on the consumer side and are now leveraging the things we do very well into other industries. We are also expanding to serve different companies, operations and industries globally,” said Bill Chen, DJI’s enterprise partnership manager. He said the use of drones in agriculture will be a particular focus for the company.

DJI has rolled out a development kit so software developers can write applications for specific tasks, signalling the company’s shift from a hardware manufacturer to platform operator. “We aim to build a versatile platform that can be addressed by third-party developers as well,” Chen said.


Here’s what you need to know about Hikvision, the camera maker behind China’s mass surveillance system

The global video surveillance equipment market is expected to grow 10.2 per cent to US$18.5 billion in 2018 thanks to increasing demand for security cameras, according to a report by London-based market research firm IHS Markit in July. China’s professional video surveillance equipment market, which accounts for 44 per cent of all global revenue, grew by 14.7 per cent in 2017, outpacing the rest of the world, which grew by only 5.5 per cent, the report showed.

Around 42 per cent of the company is controlled by state-owned enterprises, with China Electronics Technology HIK Group owning 39.6 per cent of the company as the biggest shareholder. Hikvision had a leading share of 21.4 per cent for the global closed-circuit television and video surveillance equipment market in 2017, according to IHS Markit.

IHS Markit estimated that China had 176 million surveillance cameras in public and private areas in 2017, compared to only 50 million cameras in the US. The researcher expects China to install about 450 million new cameras by 2020. The researcher expects about 450 million new cameras to be shipped to the Chinese market by the end of 2020.

The global success of Marie Kondo -- Japan’s queen of tidying -- points to an important truth for Japan’s economy: there’s massive latent value still to be unlocked as women enter the labor force, research by Bloomberg Economics shows. Unpaid work in the home was worth as much as 138.5 trillion yen ($1.25 trillion) in 2016, or 25.7 percent of GDP, according to estimates by the Cabinet Office. If more women enter the labor force, and more domestic work is monetized, that could prove a double plus for Japan’s economy -- lifting the lackluster rate of growth.

Where big leaps happen

You can be great investor and still spend yourself broke. Ego is easier to develop and maintain than alpha, so good returns without the psychology necessary to hold onto those returns where money can continue compounding can be defeating. The math of compounding ensures that neither those who earn big returns but spend them quickly, or power savers who settle for low returns, will build meaningful wealth. There are many good investors. There are many good savers. It’s the intersection of both that compounding rules wild and big leaps are made.

The same mindset that allows visionaries to see things normal people can’t blinds them to realities normal people understand. If you’re staggeringly good at one thing, your mind probably has little bandwidth for other vital things necessary to make your skill work. Look around. There are a lot of people with crazy good ideas. But many people with crazy good ideas are crazy, and their idea is an outgrowth of a mind that has little patience for things like employee culture and appeasing investors, so their idea never stands a chance. A big leap happens when a visionary mixes with a sober operator who can tame the worst impulses of an otherwise great idea.


Will accountants become the weavers of the 21st century?

Intangible assets now make up 84 percent of the market value of the S&P 500. That’s up from just 17 percent in 1975. We investors clearly value things like investment in brands, new business processes, skills development for employees, R&D, etc., as drivers of future value. In other words, we believe these investments will create revenues in the future. But accounting can’t figure out how to value those non-tangible assets, so it treats those investments as expenses. That just doesn’t make sense.

Curated Insights 2019.02.01

One big thing

For years Seder measured everything on horses. Nostril size. Excrement weight. Fast-twitch muscle fiber density. And for years he came up empty-handed. Then, Seder got the idea to measure the size of a horse’s internal organs using a portable ultrasound. Bingo. He hit pay dirt. Seth Stephens-Davidowitz tells of Seder’s discovery in Everybody Lies: He found that the size of the heart, and particularly the size of the left ventricle, was a massive predictor of a horse’s success, the single most important variable. That was it. Heart size was a better predictor of horse racing ability than anything else. And this is what Seder knew when he convinced his buyer to purchase American Pharoah and disregard the other 151 horses at auction. The rest is history.

Hans Rosling echoes this sentiment in Factfulness when he discusses the importance of a single measure in understanding a country’s development—child mortality: Do you know I’m obsessed with the number for the child mortality rate? … Because children are very fragile. There are so many things that can kill them. When only 14 children die out of 1,000 in Malaysia, this means that the other 986 survive. Their parents and their society manage to protect them from all the dangers that could have killed them: germs, starvation, violence and so on. So this number 14 tells us that most families in Malaysia have enough food, their sewage systems don’t leak into their drinking water, they have good access to primary health care, and mothers can read and write. It doesn’t just tell us about the health of children. It measures the quality of the whole society.

Rosling’s use of childhood mortality and Seder’s use of heart size perfectly exemplify the power of heuristics. A heuristic is defined as “any approach to problem solving or self-discovery that employs a practical method, not guaranteed to be optimal, perfect, logical, or rational, but instead sufficient for reaching an immediate goal.” While Rosling and Seder don’t perfectly describe the systems they are studying with a single measure, they are able to gain important insights with little information. Sometimes it helps to have lots of variables/measures, but sometimes you only need to know one big thing.

Enhancing eBay: A letter to the Board of eBay

While surprising to many, only 10% of items sold on eBay today are sold via auction, and fewer than 20% of items sold are used goods. As a result of its ability to successfully evolve and grow with the broader e-commerce market, eBay today is the world’s second largest online retailer outside of mainland China, with #1 or #2 market positions in most major geographies. Furthermore, eBay owns two other leading franchises – the premier online secondary ticket marketplace (StubHub), and a portfolio of best-in-class international classifieds websites.

Online classifieds is a fast growing industry that has benefited from a stark shift from print to online channels. Against this positive macro backdrop, the usage of online classifieds platforms continues to grow rapidly. As with all network-driven businesses, online classifieds is an industry where scale matters and success is driven by establishing a strong leadership position. In any given geography and vertical, one to two competitors generally take the majority of the market and enjoy compelling economics. Many leading classifieds platforms operate with EBITDA margins in the 40% to 60% range, with some as high as 75%. Based on our review of comparable businesses, conversations with former employees and research on the sector, we believe that eBay Classifieds Group currently operates at a much higher level of profitability than the core Marketplace, with estimated EBITDA margins that should be in the range of 45% to 55%.

As a result of these strong market tailwinds, attractive economics and significant incumbency advantages, leading classifieds businesses garner extremely attractive valuations. The average publicly traded classifieds business trades at a mid-to-high-teens forward EBITDA multiple. Furthermore, there has recently been significant acquisition interest in this space from both strategic and financial acquirers, resulting in transactions all valued at more than 20x EBITDA over the past several years.

As the leading player in a high value business with competitive barriers to entry, StubHub enjoys an attractive economic model. Today, StubHub enables the transaction of more than $4.5 billion in ticket value, up roughly 50% over the past four years. Benefiting from its market-leading position, revenue growth has surpassed GMV growth with sales up nearly 70% over the same time. While StubHub is indeed a “marketplace” for tickets, the very nature of tickets makes this platform and the features required highly distinct from the core eBay Marketplace. Despite efforts over the years to better integrate the two platforms through initiatives such as cross-promoting tickets and merchandise, eBay has never succeeded in extracting meaningful strategic synergies.

StubHub is non-core to the eBay Marketplace but would command significant value as a market-leading, scale business. The second-largest player in StubHub’s market, VividSeats, has been acquired by private equity firms twice in the past three years. The most recent acquisition came in 2017, when it was acquired for ~16x EBITDA. The third-largest player is Ticketmaster, a competitor which is part of the larger LiveNation that conducts not only secondary ticket sales, but also primary ticketing and the production and promotion of live music events. While LiveNation’s other businesses have varying economic profiles, LiveNation currently trades at ~14.5x EBITDA.


Swiping right on InterActive Corp

Maslow’s hierarchy of needs suggests friendship/intimacy/family are far more important than entertainment (sub-set of self-actualization). Pricing for PayTV subscriptions are $80-$120/month, though PayTV is generally regarded as a melting ice cube as consumers shift online. While MTCH being able to command similar ARPUs as PayTV is not my base case, the wide disparity between the ARPUs and relative importance between the two indicates significant latent pricing power for MTCH.

As Tinder’s total addressable market (“TAM”) penetration remains low (est. 50m users vs 600m singles ex-China), TAM is potentially underestimated because of the exclusion of non-singles (as noted above, a significant portion of Tinder users are non-singles), and paid user penetration is low (~4.1m average subscribers vs est. 50m users; OkCupid 2015 paid user penetration was 5.7x that of 2012 while MAU doubled and Tinder’s first-year increase in paid user penetration post-monetization was greater than that of OkCupid in 2012, per MTCH S-1), MTCH can likely grow its Tinder’s subscriber base indefinitely.

Replication of MTCH’s core dating brands is difficult due to the need for network effects stemming from initial user liquidity. Capital is not the limiting factor – dating apps with high marketing spend (i.e. hard paywalls) tend to have inferior economics as a result whereas dating apps with the best economics tend to stem from viral adoption which requires little to no marketing spend (i.e. Tinder).

Risks of new dating apps usurping MTCH’s position is mitigated by user compartmentalization of different apps and a largely unsaturated market. Users tend to compartmentalize different dating apps for different sexual strategies. For example, Tinder/Bumble are geared towards casual sexual strategies whereas Match/Coffee Meets Bagel (“CMB”) are geared towards serious sexual strategies. As a result, the average user uses more than 3 different dating apps at one time – per 2Q18 earnings call.

ANGI is in the business of helping contractors improve job turnover/time utilization and helping consumers access quality home services at lower prices through its marketplaces. Its moat is derived from network effects between consumers and contractors and economies of scale in sales and marketing. Recreating ANGI requires significant and multi-year investments in a large sales force (to attract high-quality contractors) and marketing (to attract consumers) to initiate the flywheel. Matching a contractor with a consumer is incredibly hard as the marketplace needs to have the exact capacity available at the zip code level. In addition, matching algorithms are improved with experience and data, which favors incumbents like ANGI. Moreover, given ANGI is pricing at 3%-4% take rates (per IAC 1Q17 shareholder letter) which are far below any comparable marketplace business; any new competitor would likely need to sustain operating losses due to the relative difference in scale.

ANGI has a long reinvestment runway. 90% of discovery occurs offline for US home services; consumer awareness is the bottleneck – the company with the largest sales and marketing budget and lowest customer acquisition costs (i.e. ANGI) is highly likely to acquire the most mindshare over the long-term. Per IAC 2Q16 shareholder letter, an average household has 6-8 jobs per year, with ANGI taking ~1.5 jobs, implying significant room to grow its “job-share”.

While skeptics view Amazon HomeServices as potential existential threat, this is overblown given Amazon’s core advantages are in product e-commerce, not service. Even if Amazon were to significantly ramp up its home services business, the market remains heavily under-penetrated, allowing multiple long-term winners. Such a scenario would also likely be a net benefit to ANGI as it would raise consumer awareness and hasten the transition from offline to online. Furthermore, it takes many years to build a large network of high-quality service professionals and attract a large consumer base, as ANGI can attest to. At the current time, Amazon’s home service business remains nascent.

In my view, ANGI’s primary competitors are Frontdoor and HomeServe. Frontdoor’s primary market is the US whereas HomeServe is largely UK/EU with some US exposure. Whereas ANGI provides a marketplace connecting consumers and contractors, Frontdoor and HomeServe provide home service plans.

Platforms like YouTube can and do get a large portion of the economics of their creators’ content due to their market position. Vimeo provides content creators with better economics – YouTube and Dailymotion takes 50% and 30% of a content creator’s revenue while Vimeo, in addition to a 10% cut, makes money through content creators subscribing to its creator platform. It allows content creators to monetize their content much more profitably through transactional videos-on-demand (“VODs”) instead of advertisements despite the higher content creation costs of transactional VODs. Per IAC 2Q18 shareholder letter, average revenue per subscriber (“ARPS”) at Vimeo has grown 15% per year for the last 4 years (ARPS was ~$100 per IAC 2Q17 shareholder letter), and is accelerating.

Grainger eyes mid-size companies as it invests more in Zoro.com

Grainger is investing in Zoro—which caters to smaller businesses than the larger customers that tend to use Grainger.com—to further develop its staff, expand its number of available SKUs, improve its website features, and expand its web analytics and digital marketing. In effect, Grainger will help Zoro follow in MonotaRO’s growth curve, Macpherson said.

MonotaRO has “20 million items on their website, and we are making investments in Zoro to be able to expand our offering [on Zoro.com] dramatically over the next several years,” he said on the conference call, according to a transcript from Seeking Alpha. He added that he expects Zoro’s improvement projects to be completed by the end of this year, and that Zoro will “remain profitable through the transition.”

“Zoro continues to grow very strongly,” he continued. He added that Zoro currently has several million SKUs but will eventually expand to more than 10 million. Zoro operates internationally, with dedicated e-commerce sites in the United Kingdom and Germany as well as in the United States. It also maintains an online shop on the Zoro section of eBay Canada.

As it expands its available inventory and improves its website, Zoro is also expected to increase its number of mid-sized companies in its customer base, Macpherson said. But Grainger doesn’t expect it to cannibalize many mid-size company accounts from Grainger.com, which caters more to larger customers seeking its selection of industrial and maintenance, repair and operations (MRO) products and services, he said.

Grainger has also been working to increase its overall market share of mid-size companies for industrial supplies—now at about 2%, but down from prior share figures—both by “reengaging some” customers and acquiring new ones, Macpherson said. “I would say the new-customer acquisition has been very solid over the last quarter, and we expect that to continue,” he said, adding: “Most of that is acquiring new customers digitally, and then … building a relationship with those customers.”

Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb Q4 2018 investor letter: a2Milk

a2 is a New Zealand-based producer of premium milk and baby formula with an unusually long story behind it. Sometime around five to ten thousand years ago, scientists believe that a genetic mutation began to proliferate throughout certain global populations of cows, changing the protein with the exciting and original moniker A2. Cows that inherited the mutation, by contrast, started to produce milk containing a second protein labeled–you guessed it–A1. While this is far from settled science, some researchers and nutritionists believe that because people have only been drinking A1-bearing milk for a relatively short period by evolutionary standards, our bodies have a harder time digesting it than “pure” A2 milk.

A good analogy here is Greek yogurt, which is believed in some quarters to confer health benefits you can’t get from regular yogurt. While Greek yogurt, like A2 milk, is a commodity product, companies like Fage and Chobani have built big businesses by wrapping compelling brands around it. a2Milk is attempting to do the same thing, to great effect thus far. Riding powerful consumer trends favoring products perceived to be healthy and natural, a2 has become the leading premium milk brand in Australia while making rapid inroads into the massive and quality-obsessed infant formula market in China. An effort to penetrate the US milk market is also showing early promise. Notwithstanding its remarkable success to date, a2 remains a young company, and much will depend on whether management can navigate a thorny distribution landscape in China, solidify the positioning of an embryonic brand and exploit growth opportunities in new geographies and product lines. With good execution, particularly in China, we think a2 could become a much larger business than it is today, more than justifying the statistically high price-earnings ratio we paid for our shares.

NYSE, Nasdaq rival aims to shed light on fee profits

IEX, which itself pays the big exchanges’ fees for data and connectivity, estimated the big three’s charges are between 10 times and 19 times its own costs for market data and as much as 41 times its costs for physical connectivity. In dollar terms, IEX said that while its yearly cost of providing a type of market data feed to its firm customers is $12,000 each, it pays the NYSE $226,320 and Nasdaq $196,000 annually for a similar offering. IEX’s business model differs from that of the big exchanges because it doesn’t charge its customers annual subscription fees for data and connectivity. Instead, it charges based on the size of customers’ trades executed on the IEX venue.

Their industry group, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, or Sifma, has been fighting the exchanges’ fee increases in the courts for years. In a letter to the SEC last fall, Sifma provided its own analysis of trading data and other costs. This analysis estimated that in 2018, firms paid about 10 times to 30 times more than they had in 2010 to receive the same market information. This is partly owing to the proliferation of charges incurred for the same basic data, the report noted.

The exchanges don’t disclose profit margins for these kinds of services. In the most recent quarter, Nasdaq said its information-services unit, which includes market data revenues, generated an operating-income profit margin of 65%.