Curated Insights 2019.01.25

Netflix flexes

Netflix has shows it owns completely, shows it own first-run rights to, hybrid shows like Hastings described, second-run shows — it runs the gamut. Critically, while some models are more profitable than others, all make the service more attractive to Netflix’s customers. This will be a particular challenge for a company like Disney: the company is staking a good portion of its future on its own streaming service driven by its own IP, but has not suggested a willingness to scale supply like Netflix has. That, by definition, will limit the company’s upside when it comes to consumer reach and also long-term pricing power.

T. Rowe Price’s Henry Ellenbogen on Gartner

Every company is trying to figure out how to use technology, internally and externally. One play on this is Gartner. Ninety percent of Gartner’s earnings before interest and taxes comes from its research business. It has two parts. Because of the demands that all companies have to use technology better and understand how their competitors are using it, the research product has transitioned from one that was nice to have to one you need to have. You can see it in Gartner’s numbers. Last year, it had over $2 billion of revenue and grew more than 13% organically. It’s a global business. We believe that it is going to continue to be a strong double-digit growth business.

The average customer spends $180,000 for Gartner research. They want to know what technology providers they should look at to answer their key questions. How are other people using technology and on-boarding it? How can they drive technology into a business line to get efficiency?

The other 20% of the research business is where the controversy has been. We have owned the stock since 2010. It has compounded at well over 20% since we’ve owned it. In the past two years, Gartner’s performance has been weaker, because it bought Corporate Executive Board, or CEB, a business best-practices consultant outside of technology that helps functional groups in a business understand issues in their areas.

Gartner instituted a turnaround at CEB. The product was fine, but it had to change the go-to market. They were selling by individual site license, as opposed to role-based pricing, and had to re-energize the sales force. A lot of costs have come into this division, with only modest improvement in growth; that’s where the controversy is. But Gartner now has an excellent franchise in an area that is becoming increasingly important globally.

In addition, Gartner has deleveraged. The leverage was about four times. It is now 2½ times, and the company is deleveraging at more than one time per year. They are back to buying back stock. We see low-$4 earnings per share in 2019. Free cash flow historically has been 130% or greater, because customers pay upfront. Next year, we see low-$5 EPS and close to $7 of free cash flow, and expect the company will return to trading at 20 to 25 times free cash flow, versus 18 times now.


T. Rowe Price’s Henry Ellenbogen on SS&C Technologies

When we think about compounders, the two key factors are ownership’s mentality and the durability of growth. My next pick, SS&C Technologies Holdings, came public for the second time in 2010, and we have been owners since the second IPO. Despite a mediocre 2018, the stock has compounded wealth at 24% since the IPO.

SS&C does fund accounting. It provides the pipes on the technology side and the service side for hedge funds. It’s the leading provider in the country; a lot of people in this room probably use them. And they are also the leader for private equity, and early last year, they bought DST Systems, which provides these services for mutual funds.

Bill Stone started the company in a classic American way, by getting a second mortgage on his house in 1986. He still owns 13% of it. Even in an industry where growth is neutral or negative, when you get into the plumbing, people can’t really take you out. You have a revenue stream, and you have pricing power. People worry about the health of their customers. But even under modest volume, Stone is going to have pricing power. If you change your back office and your accountants, you get all sorts of questions from your customers.

People are very concerned about the capital markets. But 10% of the company’s revenue is tied to market sensitivity; 90% isn’t. That’s about $50 million of Ebitda, if you assume a 30% correction, about 40% incremental margins. On the flip side, we believe that DST could yield an additional $50 million to $100 million of synergies beyond market expectations.

Another concern is that SS&C is 4.7 times leveraged, and the market doesn’t like leverage. This is the only highly levered name I am going to mention, and there are three reasons. First, Stone is investing his own money alongside other people’s, and he is very focused on paying down the debt. Second, the business is a very low capital-intensive one that is very sticky, and we think under normal operating situations, the leverage will be below four times by the end of this year. Third, when Stone bought DST, he got DST Health, which does $100 million of Ebitda and is a noncyclical business. If he wanted to, he could sell it at 12 to 15 times Ebitda, and that would instantly deleverage the company below three times. So he has another road out. We believe that SS&C Technologies will earn about $3.70 a share this year and $4 to $4.10 next year.


Rivulet Capital’s Oscar Schafer on Dollar Tree

Dollar Tree operates 15,000 stores under two distinct banners: Dollar Tree, a chain of variety stores selling a unique assortment of discount merchandise, all priced at a dollar, and Family Dollar, a chain of discount stores offering everyday goods and general merchandise. The Dollar Tree business is doing great, and it continues to execute on a growth model that has worked for three decades. The company acquired Family Dollar in 2015 and strove to really stabilize that business and turn it around. The reasons to be optimistic are that they have paid down debt and started ramping up investment in the Family Dollar stores. Most importantly, the stock price has declined to a point where I feel that I’m buying Dollar Tree for a fair price and getting Family Dollar for free. I like free options.

The Dollar Tree segment is a strong and stable business that will generate over 80% of consolidated operating income this year. A true “dollar” store, Dollar Tree employs a rapidly rotating assortment of merchandise to create a “treasure-hunt” experience. This format has proved to be largely insulated from e-commerce competition. The growth at Dollar Tree has been spectacular over the past 10 years, including during the financial crisis. Since 2006, the store count has more than doubled, from 3,200 to 6,900. Same-store sales growth has averaged 4.1%, and operating income is up by almost five times, with a compound annual growth rate of 15%.

Family Dollar’s business is different. A direct competitor is Dollar General. Family Dollar offers an assortment of everyday necessities in general merchandise, primarily to low-income consumers. Physical stores are much smaller; consumables make up almost 80% of the sales, and, over the past few years, the company has suffered from a litany of issues: food deflation, management turnover, and strategic operational business mishaps.

For many years, Dollar Tree was a stock-market darling, driving a 28% compound annual return from 2006 to 2014. Since acquiring Family Dollar in 2015, Dollar Tree shares have gone almost nowhere. This is due to dramatic multiple compression, not stagnating earnings. In fact, earnings were up by more than 60% in the past three years. On a combined basis, Dollar Tree is now trading at a relatively discounted valuation of less than 16 times forward earnings, and less than 10 times enterprise value to Ebitda.

We see multiple ways to win. First, we estimate that Dollar Tree can grow Ebitda at a mid-single-digit rate, even if we assume continued deterioration at Family Dollar. In this scenario, the company should still generate a billion dollars in excess free cash flow per year over the next few years. Having recently gained investment-grade status, the company can reallocate the cash flow from debt pay-down to share buybacks. This should drive double-digit earnings growth. Assuming a 16-times-earnings multiple on our estimate of 2021 earnings, I see 30% upside over the next two years.

Second, we see an opportunity for value-creating corporate action. In 2014, Dollar General attempted to buy Family Dollar for almost $10 billion. My research suggests that given the chance, Dollar General would again jump at the opportunity to consolidate its nearest rival. I estimate that the market is currently ascribing zero value to Family Dollar within Dollar Tree, so even if they sold Family Dollar at a discount to the 2015 purchase price, this would still unlock substantial value for Dollar Tree holders.

Serving the six-sided teeter totter: 2018 year in review — adventur.es

We often get asked by sellers, “What will adventur.es do for my company? What resources will you provide? What kind of growth can you promise?” Our answer is short and meant to be sweet — plan on adventur.es being a fair, long-term home for the business and its people, and nothing else. The response is almost always met with incredulity and usually leads to a great conversation.

What organizations do is overrated, while what organizations don’t do is highly underrated. It’s easy to make promises and we’ve certainly made plenty over the years that haven’t turned out well. What’s hard is following through — doing what you say you’ll do, when you said you’d do it, and under the terms agreed upon.

What’s even harder than doing what you say is intentionally not doing, and being transparent about it. Our first rule is “do no harm.” Humans are creatures of progress and crave shortcuts. We’ve learned that progress (almost) never comes by prescription, nor pill. Knowledge can light the path, but it can’t walk it for you. Often the right decision is to wait, gather more information, and reassess.

We ask that our sellers and company leadership have low expectations for us around everything except how we treat them. We’re not in the business of interventions, although we have paid for rehab a few times. If we intervene, we must see it through. It’s like a tree branch that is growing in the wrong direction. Merely pulling on it won’t solve the problem. The branch must be pulled and held, almost indefinitely. Sometimes we can help identify a poor direction, but leadership teams are the ones who pull and hold the branches.

The only other way to acquire a skill set is by hiring outside talent, a consultant, or a firm that can perform the difficult task. Again, there’s a nasty selection bias at play. If you’re excellent at a difficult-to-acquire and valuable skill, you typically don’t seek employment opportunities, or consulting gigs, or customers in small business, and especially in non-sexy industries.

Our goal is to find someone who has a range of experiences in successfully generating revenue through varied channels, building teams, and taking ownership of results. We know it’s humanly impossible for one individual to have deep experience in all the revenue disciplines. We expect this leader to build a team, both at the adventur.es level and within the portfolio companies, and draw on some stout resources already here.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *