Curated Insights 2019.01.11

Disney’s Bob Iger talks streaming, park plans, and learning from Kodak

In the case of Pixar, Marvel, and Lucas, none of them were for sale. We were the only ones. Us identifying them as acquisition targets and my going out and meeting with Steve Jobs and Ike Perlmutter and George Lucas one on one. Just alone. And broaching the subject and ultimately doing a deal. In looking back, particularly with Marvel and Lucas—Pixar was different—we had an ability to monetize those assets better than anyone else. If someone came along, we would have had a competitive advantage. You can argue that in the Comcast case with Fox, they’re probably the only other company out there that can monetize. Whether they monetize as well as we do, I don’t know. I don’t think they’re quite where we are.

What we looked at there was partly the result of the strategy we’re deploying, which is to be in the direct-to-consumer space in a very serious way. In order to do that, we needed a few things, and one of them, really the most important, was intellectual property. And when we looked at the Fox assets and brands—National Geographic, FX, Searchlight, the movie Avatar, the Marvel properties that they licensed, I could go on, The Simpsons—they had a lot that we could use to feed the beast that we’re taking to the market. And the board has been great at articulating this back to me. Had we not defined this strategy and gone for it, they would not have figured out how the Fox assets would have been of value to us. Because on the surface, you’re buying traditional businesses—cable channels and the like—and what do you need that for?

And then on top of that there was a global element to it that was very important to us. For instance, the Star assets in India. And they have a very successful business across Latin America. Sky was obviously attractive to us too, but it got less attractive as the price went up.

Wiedower Capital 2018 Annual Shareholder Letter: Trupanion

The vast majority of companies would take these increased efficiencies and let them drop to the bottom line. Not Trupanion. Their goal when the business is more mature in a few years is to have an adjusted operating margin of 15% (which equates to a net margin of around 5%). Once they achieve maturity, they want to then share all savings above that with their customers, basically capping their net margin at around 5%. Trupanion’s current loss ratio is ~70%, but their longer-term goal is to increase that to 80% (essentially giving 10% more value back to their customers).

To be clear, even if Trupanion does succeed with the scaled economies shared flywheel, it will not be as effective as Costco’s has been. An insurance company increasing loss ratios is a much less tangible benefit to the consumer vs a retailer decreasing prices. This is because retail prices can easily be compared at Costco vs Walmart or Amazon, whereas insurance policy prices are generally harder to compare apples-to-apples. However, I still believe this will make life harder on other pet insurers if Trupanion is slowly increasing their loss ratios on a yearly basis. That is tough to compete with. Very few companies are willing to pass up higher short-term profits every single year in the hopes that decreasing their prices will increase long-term customer loyalty.

For Healthy Paws (the #3 pet insurer, but the competitor I worry about the most) to have a meaningful effect on Trupanion’s customer acquisition strategy, they would have to hire and train a hundred salespeople all over the country and those people would have to spend years getting inroads into vets. And vets that already have Trupanion Express installed will have an even higher barrier to entry. Over 10% of vets in North America already have Express installed and that number is growing quickly (install growth was 42% in 2017 and over 50% in 2018).

Because of their customer acquisition cost, Trupanion loses money in the first year of all new pets they sign up. However, the average pet stays with Trupanion for over eight years, so that initial loss is made up over time. But because Trupanion is growing so fast, the cost of those new pets every year make the reported financials look worse than the progress of the underlying business. If customer acquisition costs are amortized over the life of a pet, the financials look much better.

This means that for every dollar spent on sales and marketing, Trupanion gets a 30-40% return on that invested capital. Very few businesses can maintain that return on capital for very long. Trupanion has been doing this for years and, given the industry penetration is just over 1%, they may be able to continue achieving this high return for many more years. Trupanion has the best unit economics of any company we own and, just as important, I believe these returns can continue because they are very defensible.

In addition to valuation, I believe the regulatory risks to Trupanion are overblown. The most touted regulatory risk is that many of Trupanion’s territory partners are not licensed to sell insurance—even though they don’t sell insurance and ideally never even interact with potential customers. There are fringe cases where this can be iffy though. For example, an unlicensed territory partner who talks to her friend about the benefits of Trupanion could potentially cross the line. Even in the scenario where regulators rule that all territory partners need to be licensed, I don’t believe the risk is large to Trupanion. From talking to insurance regulators about this, I expect a modest fine at worst.

The regulatory risk that I think is a bigger concern, but that gets discussed less often, is if veterinarians were required to get licensed. The veterinarians are the main conduit that connect pet owners to Trupanion. If veterinarians were required to get licensed, this would kill Trupanion’s current business model as very few vets would go through the effort of getting licensed. Here, it’s important to note that veterinarians who work with Trupanion do not explain the insurance specifics to their pet owner clients. The vets are allowed to recommend the concept of pet insurance broadly, and then discuss their personal experience with Trupanion, but that’s it. The vets do not get into insurance coverage details because that is when they would be required to get licensed.

Dureka Carrasquillo long Ferrari: Sohn London Conference

In 2017 the luxury car market was valued at $570bn. Estimates suggest it will grow at about 9% for the next 5 years. Ferrari sits in the category of luxury goods that is considered an ‘experience’ and that category is projected to grow at an even higher rate.

Special cars have historically been about 2% of sales but they will become a larger part of the business. She estimates that by 2022 special cars will represent 20% of revenues. These cars which are limited editions – often 500 cars – sell for more than $1m each and sometimes sell out on the day they go on sale. Gross margins on special cars are about 3x base cars. If the number of special cars is increased in the way that Carrasquillo predicts EBITDA margins for the whole group could increase from 33% to 38%.

Another hallmark of a luxury goods player is careful management of supply. Current product capacity is about 16,000 cars per year yet only 9000 are made. In comparison, Porsche sells 25,000 to 30,00 911s per year. Carrasquillo thinks that Ferrari could increase production to 16,000 cars per year and still sell them. Ferrari intends to launch 15 new models in the next 5 years – that’s a lot more than in the past. It takes about 40 months to produce and launch a new car.


Luke Newman long Rolls Royce: Sohn London Conference

At its heart Rolls Royce is a razor to razorblade business model – the razors – or the engines in this case – cost billions of dollars to design, deliver and install and come with an obligation to buy razorblades – service contracts – for the next 25 years. The gross margins on the service contracts are high between 50% to 70% but the engines are sold at a loss.

The secular trends in air travel are supportive driven by increasing wealth and emerging markets. Air passenger kilometres over the last 70 years have grown at 6% CAGR. If passenger growth continues at 4.5% and assuming planes have a 25-year life, 425 new wide body planes are required every year to keep up with demand. That’s 37 new wide-bodied planes every month. The production schedules for Boeing and Airbus for next year are slated at 34 per month creating positive pricing dynamics for all participants.

Over the last 20 years what was a 3-player market has become a duopoly. Pratt and Whitney took the rationale decision to concentrate on narrow body engines and ceded their market share to Rolls Royce. That did not come for free because Rolls Royce had to spend billions of dollars developing new engines to take the market share. The good news is that this year is the first year in which most of the revenue will come from the high margin aftermarket business. The company has reached a critical inflection point.

GE, the other member of the duopoly, has been in harvest mode, maintaining share and enjoying good aftermarket revenues. GE has lots of problems, but the engine business has not been one of them. GE’s engine margins have been consistently high.

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