What makes Buffett special, however, is that he has outpaced the market by a huge margin, even after accounting for those profitability and value premiums. The per-share market value of Berkshire has returned 20.9 percent annually from October 1964 through 2017, according to the company. That’s an astounding 9 percentage points a year better than a 50/50 portfolio of the Fama/French profitability and value indexes for more than five decades.
It’s a feat that can’t be dismissed as mere luck. For one thing, Buffett has been shockingly consistent, beating the 50/50 profitability/value portfolio during 40 of 44 rolling 10-year periods since 1974, or 91 percent of the time. Also, Buffett’s margin of victory is “statistically significant,” as finance aficionados would say, with a t-statistic of 3.1. That’s a fancy way of saying that there’s an exceedingly low likelihood that his outperformance is a result of chance.
In addition to its home page, Amazon is rich with the most important resource in asset management: trust.
Amazon’s hidden advantage is its ruthless commitment to per customer profitability. I’m willing to bet that the firm has our number. It knows our lifetime value as customers and how we stack up against our cohorts by age, zip code, film preference, etc. Similarly, Amazon has shown that it doesn’t hesitate to fire unprofitable customers who abuse the return privilege. If it exercises the same discernment in avoiding the worst clients, incumbent asset managers stand to lose. Amazon has no legacy costs and no legacy relationships in asset management. Furthermore, it will not plead for such relationships. If you’re a 3rd party fund manager, for instance, getting on Amazon’s platform will be like the Godfather’s offer you can’t refuse. To me, asset management is the type of utility business that Amazon could easily disintermediate, for both its own benefit and the benefit of average investors worldwide. If you thought the overbuilt status of bricks and mortar retailing provided the kindling to the Amazon explosion in retail, the abundance of asset managers (especially active asset managers) provides the uranium for an apocalypse that could be much worse.
Blankfein insists such pessimism is unwarranted in the long run. Within five years, he thinks, Marcus has the potential to dominate the refinancing of credit card debt by offering clients interest rates that are half of the penalties charged by card issuers. “The big banks have no incentive to do this — to offer a product that competes directly with their credit cards,” he says.
Blankfein insists investors will once again favor Goldman because the market forces behind its model are timeless. “We buy things from people who want to sell and sell things to people who want to buy, when in the real world, those buyers and sellers don’t usually match up,” he says. “Those things have been going on since the Phoenicians.”
Licensing deals are negotiated every couple of years, so investors will have to wait for the next chance to strike a new bargain. Growing bigger should help Spotify cut incrementally better deals, but won’t resolve the basic problem that ownership of must-have content is concentrated in so few hands. The big three plus Merlin accounted for 87% of songs streamed on Spotify last year.
But music is different: Apart from the concentration of rights ownership, new albums don’t have the same marketing pull as a new TV series. Spotify’s prospectus argues that “personalization, not exclusivity, is key to our continued success.” Competing with the record labels to get a better deal just doesn’t seem a viable option.
The Demand for Software is very strong and stable — Spend on software has grown at ~9% for about a decade. Looking forward Gartner estimates show that the Software category is expected to grow 8–11% versus the U.S. economy at 2–3% and broader technology spending at 3–4%. Software is a GOOD neighborhood to live in.
Signals from the Stock Market: “In the short term the market is a popularity contest; in the long term it is a weighing machine.” — Warren Buffett. Over many years, the market reflects the true substance of a business — here you can see that over the last 15 years, a broad basket of software companies has created meaningfully more value than a broad basket of businesses.
Business models are increasingly moving to SaaS business models because it benefits the customer. Even though the total cost of ownership of the software between the two is similar, the cash flow profile for the customer is different. SaaS shifts laying out cash for a license (capex) to an ongoing pay-as-you-go model (opex).
Investors also prefer SaaS models for two main reasons: 1. Higher predictability of future cash flow – SaaS has higher recurring revenue than license model. This provides a more consistent stream of cash flow with less ‘renewal’ risk at the end of every license. 2. Cost structure – the larger the upfront license cost, the larger the sales team required. SaaS models usually have a lower sales and distribution expense than license models.
Another reason SaaS businesses are popular with PE is because software economics match the return profile of of both VC and PE investors. Firstly, the original product with a fixed cost base plus increasing returns to scale earns a high ROIC and can scale with little capital. This matches the low-hit / high multiple return rate VC crave as they can pick the correct product and then sale with little marginal cost. PE then acquires from VC and provide the capital to acquire new products to bundle with the original offering. This strategy also matches the return profile of PE as they can acquire and add various products to the platform over the 5-7 average holding period of PE portfolio companies. Although the economics are not as good as VC stage due to the capital required, the risk is relatively lower as you have product-market fit and sticky customers.
Breaking into the top 3 percent of most-viewed [YouTube] channels could bring in advertising revenue of about $16,800 a year. That’s a bit more than the U.S. federal poverty line of $12,140 for a single person. (The guideline for a two-person household is $16,460.) The top 3 percent of video creators of all time attracted more than 1.4 million views per month.
Room for error is underappreciated and misunderstood. It’s usually viewed as a conservative hedge, used by those who don’t want to take much risk. But when used appropriately it’s the opposite. Room for error lets you stick around long enough to let the odds of benefiting from a low-probability outcome fall in your favor. Since the biggest gains occur the most infrequently – either because they don’t happen often or because they take time to compound – the person with enough room for error in part of their strategy to let them endure hardship in the other part of their strategy has an edge over the person who gets wiped out, game over, insert more tokens, at the first hiccup.
Your personal experiences make up maybe 0.00000001% of what’s happened in the world but maybe 80% of how you think the world works. People believe what they’ve seen happen exponentially more than what they read about has happened to other people, if they read about other people at all. We’re all biased to our own personal history. Everyone. If you’ve lived through hyperinflation, or a 50% bear market, or were born to rich parents, or have been discriminated against, you both understand something that people who haven’t experienced those things never will, but you’ll also likely overestimate the prevalence of those things happening again, or happening to other people.